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(3) Table of Authorities 
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(4) A brief statement showing the jurisdiction of the appellate court. 
As outlined already in the docketing statement: 
(c)(2) The statutory provision that confers jurisdiction on the appellate court is 78A-4-103(h). 
(c)(3) The following dates relevant to a determination of the timeliness of the notice of appeal: 
(c)(3)(A) The date of entry of the final order is May 8th 2008. See Exhibit A. 
(c)(3)(B) The date the notice of appeal was filed was June 4th 2008. See Exhibit B. 
(c)(3)(C) A motion for a new trial pursuant to rule 59, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure was filed and 
served on May 22nd 2008. 
The review of the order entered on May 8th 2006 is explicitly given by: 
2007 UT App 95, Case #20070006, Filed March 15th 2007, which held: 
Here, the trial court's order did not resolve the 
controversy between the parties. Although the order addressed 
several issues, it expressly reserved the primary issue, custody 
of the children, for trial. As a result, it is not a final 
appealable order. See id 
In sum, the trial court's order is not a final appealable 
order. As a result, this court lacks jurisdiction over this 
appeal and must dismiss it. See Bradbury, 2000 UT 50 at 118. 
Accordingly, this appeal is dismissed without prejudice to 
the filing of a timely notice of appeal after the entry of a 
final order. 
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(5) A statement of the issues presented for review, including for each issue: the standard 
of appellate review with supporting authority; and 
(a)(5)(A) citation to the record showing that the issue was preserved in the trial court; or 
As stated in Petitioner's "Brief for February 28th Hearing" filed with the Court on 
February 17th 2006 and heard on February 28th 2006. 
(6) Constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, and regulations: 
UCA 78-3 la-107 states: 
(1) An agreement contained in a record to submit to arbitration any 
existing or subsequent controversy arising between the parties to the 
agreement is valid, enforceable, and irrevocable except upon a ground 
that exists at law or in equity for the revocation of a contract. 
(2) The court shall decide whether an agreement to arbitrate exists or a 
controversy is subject to an agreement to arbitrate. 
(3) An arbitrator shall decide whether a condition precedent to 
arbitrability has been fulfilled and whether a contract containing a valid 
agreement to arbitrate is enforceable. 
(7) A statement of the case. 
1) On November 10, 2005 the parties participated in a settlement conference. Present at 
that meeting were the parties, their attorneys, the Guardian ad Litem, and the custody 
evaluators, Kim Peterson and Natalie Malovich. See R. 3790. 
2) The parties recorded into a taper recorder in the commissioners office a settlement 
agreement comprising a full resolution of all issues which was lost for reasons unknown. 
3) The Court held a seven (7) hour evidentiary hearing on February 28, 2006 resulting in 
the entry of an order that all aspects of the litigation between the parties were settled on 
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by the agreement, and making specific findings of what there was no dispute of, what 
was disputed and decided by the court, and what the court could not determine the facts 
of. See R. 3787. 
4) The court also ordered that because of the litigation between the parties, it was not in 
the best interests of the children to adopt the agreement of the parties with respect to 
custody, but to determine that independently. 
5) The court of appeals would not allow a direct appeal of this order because a final order 
of custody was not entered. 
6) Petitioner and appellant is not appealing any aspect of subsequent custody 
determination, just any enforcement of the agreement. 
(8) Summary of arguments. 
8.1 The agreement is not enforceable as a matter of law. Because the court found that the 
agreement of the parties was against public policy, in that arbitration to decide custody 
disputes is not enforceable in Utah, the entire agreement must be discarded as there was 
no severability clause. 
8.2 The agreement was not enforceable, as the findings of fact of the court clearly 
indicate that the court could NOT determine all aspects of the lost agreement as a matter 
of law the agreement should not have been enforced. 
(9) Argument 
9.1 The agreement is not enforceable. 
The court specifically found at R. 3792 that: 
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F. Arbitration: All "new" legal and equitable claims (involving only 
the parties) would be submitted to binding arbitration. The parties 
designated former judge David Roth as the preferred arbitrator. The losing 
party in arbitration will bear the other party's full costs and fees associated 
with the arbitration. 
Again at R. 3795 the court found with regard to arbitration: 
1fl9 The Court finds it is more likely than not that the parties agreed 
to refer to arbitration all subsequently-arising disputes that did not involve 
the children. However, based on the evidence presented, the Court cannot 
find clear agreement regarding how parenting and other child-rearing 
disputes will be handled if the parties wish to further challenge the Special 
Master's determinations on those issues. Presumably, those matters would 
proceed to the Court for judicial resolution. Given the litigiousness of these 
parties it is highly likely that they would take every opportunity to continue 
bringing to Court any issues remotely related to the children. As such, the 
Court finds that one of the ostensible goals of this settlement agreemnent— 
n-iinimizing future opportunities for conflict on issues involving the 
children—is not likely to be achieved. 
While as an alternative argument I have argued that the court could not determine 
the exact agreement, thus must not enforce it, assuming that the arbitration was agreed to 
it is not a legal agreement. Where an agreement is in existence, it is the responsibility of 
the arbitrator not the court to determine if it is enforceable. However the court has 
already determined it is not possible for the court to grant this power to an arbitrator. See 
R. 3790 1f8 which held: 
1f8 "Children of divorcing parents are, in a very practical sense, 
wards of the court which is charged to regard their best interests. Before 
approving an agreement regarding child custody or support, the court 
should satisfy itself that the provisions for the care and maintenance of the 
children are adequate and sufficient." 24A Am. Jur. 2d Divorce and 
Separation § 946 (citing Bell v. Bell, 572 So. 2d 841 (Miss. 1990)). 
Continued action in the Trial Court has already, and would continue to violate the 
Uniform Arbitration act by making decisions which should be made by the Arbitrator, as 
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stated in Petitioner's "Response and Agreement with Motion to enforce Settlement 
Agreement" filed with the Court on Januaiy 26th 2006 and heard on February 28th 2006, 
UCA 78-3 la-107 states: 
(1) An agreement contained in a record to submit to arbitration any 
existing or subsequent controversy arising between the parties to the 
agreement is valid, enforceable, and irrevocable except upon a ground 
that exists at law or in equity for the revocation of a contract. 
(2) The court shall decide whether an agreement to arbitrate exists or a 
controversy is subject to an agreement to arbitrate. 
(3) An arbitrator shall decide whether a condition precedent to 
arbitrability has been fulfilled and whether a contract containing a valid 
agreement to arbitrate is enforceable. 
Thus the entire agreement is not enforceable. 
9.2 Could not determine all aspects. 
The order itself states that the court COULD NOT determine all aspects of the 
agreement. See R. 3795 at Tf 19: 
^However, based on the evidence presented, the Court cannot find clear agreement 
regarding how parenting and other child-rearing disputes will be handled if the parties 
wish to further challenge the Special Master's determinations on those issues. 
This was only one of many non-agreements outlined by the court in it's own order. 
The law is clear, where an agreement is lost, as in this case, it is only enforceable when 
the court can establish all aspects of the lost agreement and that it existed. In Banks v. 
Mitsubishi Motors Credit (5th Cir 12/09/2005) Attached as Exhibit D The 5th Circuit 
Appeals Court enforced an agreement to arbitrate any dispute and held that it is not 
required that a party produce the writing if there is (1) proof that the writing actually 
existed at one time plus (2) proof of what was in the writing. This case is directly 
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applicable to the situation at hand as all agree that a document(tape) with an agreement to 
arbitrate existed, and was recorded 
Judge Lindberg further ruled that an agreement was present on December 8th 
2005, despite the testimony of respondent that uWe don't agree" Exhibit C, Trial 
Transcript Page 139 line 15. Furthermore if indeed the parties agreed on November 10th 
to resolve all further disagreements by Binding Arbitration as the Court has ruled, 
enforcement of a subsequent alleged agreement on December 8th 2005 is beyond the 
jurisdiction of the court and lies with the Binding Arbitrator. The absurdity of this ruling 
in circular reference is clear. 
(10) A short conclusion stating the precise relief sought. 
10.1 For an order that the agreement between the parties is not enforceable as against 
public policy. 
10.2 For an order that the agreement between the parties is not enforceable as the specific 
findings of fact made by the court show that no complete agreement was reached or 
reproduced by the court. 
(11) An addendum to the brief contains the following: 
All constitutional provisions were produced verbatim in the brief. 
All cases cited are published. 
The findings of fact and conclusions of law are attached as Exhibit A. 
Dated this l_Lday of January, 2009 
Loger Bryner 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT %. 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
MAY - g 2806 
SAL] 
°«P«ty Clerk 
ROGER BRYNER, 
vs. 
Petitioner, 
SVETLANA BRYNER, 
Respondent. 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW, AND JUDGMENT ON 
CROSS-MOTIONS TO ENFORCE 
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT 
Case No. 044904183 
Judge Denise Posse Lindberg 
If 1 This case involves a highly contentious divorce.1 At issue before the Court is the 
question whether an enforceable settlement agreement was reached by the parties on or about 
November 10lh, 2005. On that date the parties met in a settlement conference with the 
Commissioner. After negotiations, the parties attempted to place the terms of the agreement on 
the record before the Commissioner. Although a Minute Entry of that meeting with the 
Commissioner exists, no official recording of that meeting and the terms of the purported 
agreement has been found. Soon thereafter, the parties began to dispute the specific terms of the 
agreement. The parties continued meeting to resolve their differences and execute the 
agreement. Although the parties achieved some success in narrowing their differences, the 
parties ultimately declined to sign the Stipulation. As a result of this impasse, on December 21, 
2005, Respondent filed a Verified Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement. Petitioner concurs 
that an agreement was reached by the parties and should be enforced. However, he puts forward 
a different version of the purported agreement. Essentially then, the Court is faced with cross-
motions to enforce conflicting versions of a purported agreement.2 
Tf2 The Court held a seven (7) hour evidentiary hearing on February 28, 2006. Petitioner, 
Roger Bryner, appeared pro se. Respondent, Svetlana Bryner, was present and represented by 
lOn or about July 16, 2004, Petitioner filed a Petition for Divorce alleging that the parties 
had entered an unsolemnized marriage of approximately 10 years' duration (June 1994-June 
2004), during which time the parties held themselves out as husband and wife, Respondent took 
Petitioner's surname as her own, and two children were born. 
2This simplified summary deliberately omits reference to the numerous motions and other 
filings spawned by this attempt at settlement. Although not specifically addressed here, all 
filings were reviewed by the Court in advance of the hearing held February 28, 2006. 
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her counsel, Emily Broadhead Smoak. Guardian ad Litem, Kim Luhn, also appeared and 
addressed the Court. After hearing the testimony and receiving exhibits, the Court entered 
preliminary findings of fact and conclusions of law. Normally, the Court would rely on one of 
the parties to prepare an Order reflecting and supporting the Court's Findings, Conclusions, and 
Judgment. However, given the litigation history between these parties, the Court determined that 
it would prepare its own Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Judgment. By doing so, the 
Court hoped to eliminate one more opportunity for disagreement between the parties. 
TJ3 While in the process of memorializing its Findings, Conclusions and Judgment in this 
case, the Court was asked by Judge Dever if it would accept the transfer of another case 
(involving an ex parte civil stalking injunction) which Petitioner had initiated against 
Respondent the day before the February 28th hearing.3 The Court agreed. Following an 
evidentiary hearing held on April 11th on the new civil stalking case, the Court entered an 
Amended Order dated April 20, 2006 (the "April 20th Order"), hi connection with the April 20th 
Order, the Court entered several additional rulings, one of which is pertinent here. In that ruling 
the Court acknowledged that following the February 28th hearing it had entered preliminary 
findings that the parties had reached an enforceable agreement on most issues raised in the 
divorce case. Notably, however, at no time during the February 28th hearing did Petitioner or 
Respondent proffer any evidence concerning the welfare of the children, or how it would be 
affected by enforcement of the settlement agreement. Rather, the parties assumed that the 
compromise settlement would benefit the children.4 
Tf4 The Court is now questioning whether enforcing all the terms of the settlement agreement 
is in the best interests of the children. The Court's reconsideration stems from the fact that the 
3On February 27, 2006, Petitioner sought, and received, an ex parte stalking injunction 
against Respondent. See Third District Court Case No. 060903365. That case had been assigned 
to Judge Dever. 
At no time during the February 28th hearing did Petitioner inform the Court of this 
development. Respondent only became aware of it after she was served with the ex parte Order 
in early March. As a result of that Order, Respondent was precluded from attending the 
children's school and participating in various school-based activities. 
Pursuant to statute, Respondent's counsel requested an expedited evidentiary hearing, 
which was held by this Court on April 11, 2006. Following that hearing the Court determined 
that the petition for a civil stalking injunction should be dismissed with prejudice, and ordered 
that the related ex parte civil stalking injunction be lifted. See id., Amended Order, dated April 
2006. 
4The closest anyone came to that issue was the Guardian ad Litem, who expressed 
concern about proceeding without the input of the custody evaluators. Those remarks by the 
Guardian came at the end of a long day, and after the close of evidence. Unfortunately, the Court 
did not "pick up" on those remarks until subsequent events highlighted the issue for the Court. 
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litigiousness of the parties continues unabated, and they appear wholly incapable of resolving 
even the simplest issues in good faith and on their own (i.e., without involving judicial or law 
enforcement resources). This state of affairs seriously calls into question the ability of these 
individuals to effectively co-parent their children, as contemplated by the agreement. 
T|5 Because of this concern, the Court asked the parties and the Guardian ad litem to file 
supplemental memoranda on the advisability of enforcing the settlement agreement.5 So that the 
parties could provide their input, the Court deferred entering its final Findings, Conclusions, and 
Judgment until after the supplemental memoranda had been received and reviewed. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1f6 Settlements are favored in the law, and should be encouraged because of benefits 
accruing to the parties and the judicial system. In re Adoption of EH v. R.C, 103 P.3d 177, 180 
(Utah Ct. App. 2004) (citing Tracy-Collins Bank & Trust v. Travelstead, 592 P.2d 605, 607 
(Utah 1979)). A trial court has the "power to summarily enforce on motion a settlement 
agreement entered into by the litigants while the litigation is pending before it." Id. The 
determination of whether to enforce a settlement agreement is governed by basic contract 
principles. Mascaro v. Davis, 741 P.2d 938, 942 (Utah 1987). hi determining whether the parties 
created an enforceable contract, a court should consider all preliminary negotiations, offers and 
counteroffers, and interpret the various expressions of the parties. Nunley v. Westates Casing 
Serv 's, Inc., 989 P.2d 1077, 12080 (Utah 1999). Moreover, a party cannot rely on the fact that a 
settlement agreement has not been signed-a signature is not a requirement to enforcement. 
Goodmandsen v. Liberty Vending Sys., 866 P.2d 581, 584 (Utah Ct. App. 1993); Murray v. State, 
737 P.2d 1000, 1001 (Utah 1987). 
\J However, in a divorce context, the Court sits as a court of equity, and is not bound by the 
stipulation of the parties. See Klein v. Klein, 544 P.2d 472 (Utah 1975)("It is an established rule 
that a stipulation pertaining to matters of divorce, custody and property rights therein, though 
advisory upon the court . . . is not necessarily binding on the cour t . . . . It is only a 
recommendation to be adhered to if the court believes it to be fair and reasonable"); see also 
Landv. Land, 605 P.2d 1248 (Utah 1980). See generally 24A Am. Jur. 2d, Divorce and 
Separation § 938 : 
It is the duty of the court to enter orders affecting divorced parties' children that it 
'The Court pointedly informed the parties that their supplemental memoranda should not 
exceed 5 pages, and should provide a legal analysis of the issue. Although all the memoranda 
submitted generally conform to the Court's page-limit requirements, both Petitioner and 
Respondent have added attachments. Respondent attaches one Utah case in support of its legal 
analysis. Petitioner, on the other hand, has added voluminous attachments of, at best, tangential 
relevance. Since the Court specifically indicated a 5-page limit, that is all the Court has 
reviewed. The Court also notes that Petitioner's supplemental memoranda is limited to 
discussing the "parenting plan." 
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believes to be in the best interest of the children, and it is a responsibility that 
cannot be delegated or abrogated by agreement of the parties. Contracts as to 
custody are not controlling upon the court, although contracts between the spouses 
as to the custody of the children will generally be recognized unless the welfare of 
the children requires a different disposition. 
If 8 "Children of divorcing parents are, in a very practical sense, wards of the court which is 
charged to regard their best interests. Before approving an agreement regarding child custody or 
support, the court should satisfy itself that the provisions for the care and maintenance of the 
children are adequate and sufficient." 24A Am. Jur. 2d Divorce and Separation § 946 (citing Bell 
v. Bell, 572 So. 2d 841 (Miss. 1990)). 
Tf9 "When the parties submit a settlement agreement to the court in a dissolution proceeding, 
the court can reject some of the terms, and make an independent ruling on those issues and 
incorporate the independent ruling and the remainder of the separation agreement into the 
decree " 24A Am. Jur. 2d §1124 (citing Welly v. Welly, 55 Ohio App. 3d 111, 562N.E.2d 914 
(6th Dist. Williams County 1988)). See also Guthrie v. Guthrie, 277 Ga. 700, 594 S.E.2d 356 
(2004) ("When a trial court is presented with a settlement agreement in a divorce proceeding, the 
divorce court may exercise its discretion in deciding whether to make any or part of the 
settlement agreement between the parties a part of the final decree.") (emphasis added). 
1[10 Having received the parties' supplemental memoranda, reviewed the applicable law, and 
considered the evidence and testimony presented at the February 28, 2006 hearing, the Court now 
enters the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
T(ll On November 10, 2005 the parties participated in a settlement conference. Present at that 
meeting were the parties, their attorneys, the Guardian ad Litem, and the custody evaluators, Kim 
Peterson and Natalie Malovich.6 
Tfl2 The Court's review of the parties' competing submissions, each of which purport to 
represent the "true" agreement of the parties, makes clear that during the November 10th meeting 
6Based on the testimony received on February 28th, it appears that the custody evaluators 
participated in the settlement conference, but did not go into the Commissioner's chambers when 
the parties attempted to put their agreement on the record. Dr. Malovich testified that her purpose 
in being present at the settlement conference was "to comment, if asked, about how certain 
proposals would impact the children." However, during the February 28th hearing Dr. Malovich 
was not asked about, and did not comment, on those issues. Nor, for that matter, did Mr. 
Peterson. 
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the parties reached agreement on a significant number of issues, including the following:' 
A. Final agreement: The stipulation would constitute a final settlement of all issues 
then-outstanding between the parties. 
B. Custody: The parties would share legal and physical custody of the children. 
C. Parenting Plan: 
1. Dr. Matt Davies would serve as Special Master to help the parties resolve 
any parent-time or other "minor" parenting issues. All disputed issues 
involving the children would first be submitted to the Special Master, who 
would have decision-making authority. 
2. The parties would act in the children's best interest, would work to 
minimize disputes between the parties, and would not involve the children 
in those disputes. 
3. Physical custody/parent-time would occur on an alternating, "week-on, 
week-off' basis.8 
D. Travel: Each party would have unrestricted international travel with the children 
upon 60 days' written notice to the other parent; unrestricted travel within the 
U.S.A. on 48 hours' notice. However, if the anticipated out-of-state domestic 
travel was to extend for more than one week, the other parent would be entitled to 
30 days' notice.9 The children's passports, currently in the custody of one of Mr. 
Bryner's ex-counsel (Russell Minas), would be transferred to, and held by, the 
7Where the language or substantive meaning of the competing submissions is essentially 
identical, the Court's Findings will not restate those provisions in detail, but merely summarize 
their import. There are a number of areas in Petitioner's submittal that, at first blush, appear 
different because of underlining or crossed-out items. However, in most cases the apparent 
differences are not substantive. 
8The parties' specified how the alternating weeks would work, including arrangements for 
picking-up the children, holidays/vacation-time, and summer-time schedule. 
9On its face, the domestic {i.e., U.S.A.) travel provision does not appear to require that the 
required notice be provided in writing, in contrast to the international travel provision which so 
specifies. Nevertheless, given the amount of specific travel-related infomiation which the parties 
subsequently agreed would have to be provided by the traveling parent to the non-traveling 
parent, it appears that this omission may have been an oversight rather than an intended 
distinction in how domestic vs. international travel would be treated. 
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Special Master. The Special Master would make the passports available to the 
traveling parent within one week of receiving notice of intent to travel 
internationally. The traveling parent would return the passport to the Special 
Master within one week of completing the international travel.10 The traveling 
parent would be required to arrange for telephonic communication between the 
children and the non-traveling party. 
E. Child support and medical expenses: The parties agreed that neither would pay 
child support to the other, but that each would pay 50% of all medical and dental 
insurance premiums, medical, dental, optical, orthodontic and mental health 
expenses incurred on behalf of the children. 
F. Arbitration: All "new" legal and equitable claims (involving only the parties) 
would be submitted to binding arbitration. The parties designated former judge 
David Roth as the preferred arbitrator. The losing party in arbitration will bear the 
other party's full costs and fees associated with the arbitration. 
G. Communications/Emergencies: On non-urgent maters, the parties would 
communicate via "civil" email, notebooks, or through a third-party provider. On 
urgent matters, the parties would be free to communicate directly. 
H. Appointment of Custody/Parent time evaluators: hi the event a petition to 
modify a final order is filed raising custody or parent time issues, the current 
custody evaluators (Mr. Peterson and Dr. Malovich) would again be appointed as 
evaluators if requested by either party. 
I. Tax exemptions: Each party would be able to claim one child each year. Ms. 
Bryner would arrange to file promptly an amended tax return for 2004 (year 
during which she apparently claimed both children), and Mr. Bryner would pay 
10r 
°During the February 28th hearing it became apparent that even these apparently agreed-
upon travel related provisions could form the basis of further "game-playing" by the parties m 
order to frustrate the other. For example, Petitioner hinted at a scenario where if one parent gave 
the required notice of intent to travel internationally, the other parent could immediately give 
notice of his/her intent to also travel internationally. The parties would then raise competing 
claims on the children's passports, ostensibly so each could make the necessary travel 
arrangements. Another example of how the parties could frustrate the other became evident 
when Petitioner chose to delete what would normally be a non-controversial, indeed pro forma, 
provision requiring the non-traveling parent to take all necessary steps to facilitate the children's 
travel with the other parent. 
>w> 
the fees associated with the preparation of the amended return.11 
J. Attorney's fees: The parties would bear their own attorney's fees. 
TJ13 A draft written stipulation was prepared, but areas of disagreement soon emerged. The 
parties, their attorneys, the Guardian ad Litem, and both custody evaluators again met on or about 
December 8, 2005 in order to resolve the remaining disagreements. After further discussion it 
was determined that the Guardian ad Litem would take a draft stipulation originally prepared by 
Jared Coleman, and revise it to incorporate the parties' further agreement. 
|^14 Petitioner has argued that in determining the terms of the settlement agreement, the Court 
can only look to the negotiations that occurred on November 10, 2005. Petitioner undercut his 
own argument, however, when, during the February 28th hearing, he admitted that some of the 
terms found his version of the November 10th agreement were actually negotiated during the 
discussions of December 8th. For example, both Petitioner's and Respondent's versions of the 
agreement contain a provision that in essence directs that in the event of one parent's demise 
prior to the children reaching age of majority, the other parent will ensure that the children 
nevertheless maintained meaningful visitation with the family of the deceased parent. 
Respondent's Ex. A, Final Stipulation and Settlement Agreement f 8, at 3. That item is one of 
several that was not discussed on November 10th, but rather was added on December 8th. The 
Court expressly rejects Petitioner's argument that only the November 10th agreement is at issue. 
The Court finds that the discussions of December 8th refined and modified further the substance 
of the agreement reached on November 10th. Accordingly, it is proper to consider those items as 
well. Furthermore, based on the testimony received on February 28th, the Court finds that on 
December 8th the parties further clarified the following previously negotiated issues, thereby 
incorporating them into their agreement:12 
A. Holiday/vacation time: The parties agreed that whenever "Monday is a school 
holiday, the parent with the children will continue to exercise parent time through 
Monday, and will take the children to school on Tuesday morning." Respondent's 
Ex. A, Final Stipulation and Settlement Agreement ^|5, at 2. Additionally, 
"spring break" was added to the list of holiday/vacation periods which would 
alternate between the parents, id. at f^6, at 3, and the Special Master was given 
1
 Petitioner's version of the parties' agreement deletes a provision making him 
responsible for any additional taxes and penalties associated with filing the amended tax return. 
As noted infra, the Court finds that the agreement was that he would receive the benefit of 
having Respondent amend her return, and therefore he should be responsible for all associated 
fees and costs, including any taxes or penalties. 
,2Upon direct questioning by the Court during the February 28th hearing, Petitioner 
expressly reaffirmed his agreement with each of the items specified in this paragraph (including 
all subsections). 
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"authority to make minor adjustments to the visitation schedule and/or the parties 
may agree to a specific calendar in writing." Id. 
B. Travel: The parties specified that as part of the notice to be given to the non-
traveling parent, the traveling parent would provide "destination addresses, places 
where the children and traveling parent can be reached, and the name and 
telephone number of an available third person who would be knowledgeable of 
the children's location." Respondent's Ex. A, Final Stipulation and Settlement 
Agreement f 10, at 3. Additionally, the parties authorized the Special Master to 
decide details related to how the children would stay in telephonic contact with 
the non-traveling parent (Le.., frequency, length and timing of such contact). 
C. Schooling: The parties clarified that there would be no home-schooling for the 
children. Additionally, the parties agreed that tc[a]bsent the express, written 
agreement of the parties, [Petitioner] will have the right to choose the children's 
school by making no more than one change to a different private school and one 
change to a public school. The transition of the children from a junior high school 
into the scheduled high school will not be deemed to be a change." Respondent's 
Ex. A, Final Stipulation and Settlement Agreement, ^[13(c).13 
D. Child support and medical expenses: The parties agreed that they would 
"cooperate to choose a new therapist for the children." Id. at ^ [14. 
f 15 On December 15, 2005, Petitioner, Respondent, and the Guardian ad Litem met for a final 
time, presumably to execute the revised settlement agreement. Petitioner raised additional 
objections. Neither party signed the document. 
If 16 The parties' disagreement principally centers on three substantive areas. The first 
involves the question of which issues, going forward, are to be submitted to binding arbitration. 
The second involves the issue of school choice, including length of time the children will attend 
private school and allocation of schooling costs. The third involves the status of all past claims 
and current litigation between the parties, including litigation brought by the parties' relatives 
against either party. 
1J17 As noted supra, on November 10th the parties agreed to use a Special Master to deal with 
13During the hearing Petitioner agreed that on December 8th the parties had discussed the 
issue of meeting with the administrators or teachers at the Sandy, Utah campus of Challenger 
School in order to ask for the children to be readmitted. See Respondent's Ex. A, Final 
Stipulation and Settlement Agreement, at 1(13(f). However, he maintained that he never agreed 
to that term. Similarly, Petitioner contends that the terms outlined at Tfl3(g) were discussed on 
December 8th, but he did not agree. The Court has insufficient evidence before it to enter findings 
on those points, but neither issue is of particular importance in the overall agreement. 
y\v\ 
disputed parenting issues. The parties also agreed to use binding arbitration in lieu of further 
litigation on "new" disputed issues. However, they disagree on whether all subsequently-arising 
disputes would be referred to arbitration (including parenting issues, as Respondent contends) or 
some issues would be carved out from arbitration and left for resolution by the Court (as 
Petitioner argues). 
f l8 The version of the agreement put forward by Respondent is, at the very least, ambiguous 
on this point. At worst, the structure and language of Respondent's version tends to undercut her 
argument that the parties intended binding arbitration to apply to parenting issues. To be sure, 
the "parenting plan" section of Respondent's version there is a reference to submitting parenting 
issues to arbitration following action by a Special Master. However, that provision appears to be 
inconsistent with the notion (also put forward by Respondent), that the Special Master would 
have "authority to make decisions on all parent time or minor parenting matters." See Ex. A to 
Respondent's Verified Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement, ^|3, at 2. Arbitration is 
discussed in more detail in a separate section captioned "[w]aiver of all prevous [sic] claims and 
causes of action/' There, at | f l6,17, it states that "[a]ny and all legal and equitable claims solely 
between the parties . . . must be submitted to binding arbitration." [^16 (same). Arguably, that 
language would exclude submitting to arbitration issues involving the children, who-while 
clearly affected by the decisions that are made, are not technically "parties" to this action.14 
^19 The Court finds it is more likely than not that the parties agreed to refer to arbitration all 
subsequently-arising disputes that did not involve the children. However, based on the evidence 
presented, the Court camiot find clear agreement regarding how parenting and other child-rearing 
disputes will be handled if the parties wish to further challenge the Special Master's 
determinations on those issues. Presumably, those matters would proceed to the Court for 
judicial resolution. Given the litigiousness of these parties it is highly likely that they would take 
every opportunity to continue bringing to Court any issues remotely related to the children. As 
such, the Court finds that one of the ostensible goals of this settlement agreement-minimizing 
future opportunities for conflict on issues involving the children-is not likely to be achieved. 
Tf20 On the issue of school choice, the parties agreed that Petitioner would select the school(s) 
the children would attend. Petitioner argues that the parties agreed he would have unfettered 
choice regarding school selection, and how long the children would remain in private schools. 
Respondent contends that Petitioner's ability to select the children's schooling was subject to 
certain express limitations, such as agreeing to pay the children's private school tuition or, if the 
children were in public school, paying money into a college fund for the children. 
f21 The Court finds that Respondent expressly traded receiving the statutoiy child support in 
14The Court recognizes that in this case the children are represented by a Guardian ad 
Litem who has the right and responsibility to appear on their behalf. However, even in this 
context, the Court is not convinced that the Guardian becomes a "party" to the action within the 
technical definition of that term. 
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exchange for having Petitioner pay the private school tuition for the children. The Court further 
finds that in making this trade, the parties contemplated that those private school costs would be 
roughly comparable to what Petitioner would have been required to pay in child support. 
Respondent would lose the benefit of that bargain if, as Petitioner contends, he would have 
unfettered school choice including the option to have the children attend public school without 
contributing an offsetting amount, comparable to private school tuition, into the children's 
college fund. The Court finds that Petitioner's choice was limited to either (A) choosing between 
private schools through 12th grade, in which case he would be solely responsible for paying the 
school tuition and fees, or, (B) opting for a public high school for the children, but then paying 
into the children's college fund. The Court further finds that the parties contemplated and agreed 
that the children would remain in private schools during their elementary and middle school 
years. 
Tf22 The parties disagree on whether or not Petitioner agreed to repay Respondent for all the 
private school tuition costs Respondent incurred in 2005 and 2006 on behalf of the children. 
Petitioner says he never agreed to this; Respondent argues he agreed to this as part of the 
December 8th negotiations. Given the Court's finding fat T{21) that Respondent expressly traded 
receiving child support in exchange for the tuition, the Court credits Respondent's position on 
this matter. The Court finds that the parties agreed that Petitioner would fully, and timely, repay 
Respondent for tuition previously paid by her. The Court further finds that Petitioner owes 
Respondent $3,500.00 for those costs incurred during 2005-2006, and judgment should enter 
against him in that amount. Furthermore, Petitioner should be required to pay those costs within 
a reasonable time of the entry of judgment. 
Tf23 With respect to the third major area of disagreement-the status of past claims and current 
litigation between/among the parties or their relatives-the record is somewhat confused. 
Respondent, supported by the Guardian ad Litem, contends that a critical outcome of the 
agreement concerned the dismissal, with prejudice, of all past claims and pending cases in any 
way related to these parties. The Guardian went so far as to state that, in her view, this was a 
"deal breaker." That is, the Guardian would never have agreed to the settlement if Petitioner 
could re-litigate past or present claims. From the Guardian's perspective, the continuing 
litigiousness of the parties generally, and Petitioner in particular, is undermining the welfare of 
the children.1* Accordingly, this aspect of the agreement was non-negotiable. For his part 
15In the Guardian's Supplemental Memorandum re: Settlement Agreement filed April 18, 
2006 she states: 
The primary basis for the approval by the guardian ad litem 
of the settlement agreement between these parties providing for 
joint physical custody of the parties' children with an equal 
timesharing schedule was two fold. First and foremost, it required 
an end to all litigation to date, and second, it provided an 
alternative and hopefully more efficient future dispute resolution 
procedure . . . . If past litigation was terminated and a process put 
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Petitioner argues that he only agreed to dismiss claims without prejudice. He further argues that 
he cannot legally bind his relatives to an agreement limiting their right to seek redress in the 
courts. 
[^24 The Court's Minute Entry for November 10, 2005, entered by Commissioner Blomquist's 
clerk, represents the only "official" record of the parties' appearance before the Commissioner to 
document their agreement, hi support of his position Petitioner relies [^8 of that Minute Entry, 
which states that "[a] 11 claims pending regarding this case or third parties will be dismissed 
without prejudice" (Emphasis added). Petitioner's Trial Ex. 003. Petitioner also relies on a copy 
of the handwritten notes made by Respondent's counsel on November 10th. Plaintiffs Ex. 5 
[hereinafter "counsel's notes]. Counsel's notes include two references to dismissal of claims. 
One reference clearly notes "all causes of actions that have been filed all dismissed w/ 
prejudice." Plaintiffs Ex. 5, at 3 (second handwritten page). However, on the first handwritten 
page of that exhibit there is another entry which appears to show dismissal "w/o prejudice" and 
the "o" in "w/o" appears crossed-off. Petitioner pointed to that as evidence that the dismissal 
was intended to be without prejudice, but did not address the second, clear reference in the notes 
to dismissal with prejudice. 
TJ25 After hearing all the testimony and reviewing the relevant documents the Court finds that 
the parties intended the dismissal of all past claims and present causes of action to be with 
prejudice.16 The Court believes and finds that % 8 of the Minute Entry is in error, much like the 
immediately preceding paragraph in the Minute Entry is also in error when it references the 
arbitrator as "Bill Roth," instead of David Roth. The Court especially credits the statements of 
the Guardian ad Litem on this issue. The Court agrees with the Guardian that the main goal of 
this settlement agreement was to protect the children from the unceasing litigation between these 
in place for speedy resolution of legitimate future claims, the 
parties would be free to concentrate upon parenting their children. 
Clearly, while neither party is without fault in causing 
hostility between them which negatively affects their children, Mr. 
Bryner continues to abuse the court process and continues to be 
litigious to a level which can only continue to harm his children. 
His obsession with filing multiple motions, pleadings and new 
actions can only take from his children his energy, focus, time and 
financial resources. The litigation reached a new low with the 
issuance of the second stalking injunction because it directly 
harmed the children's relationship with their mother . . . . And, Mr. 
Bryner continues to do all of these things despite repeated and 
professional advice and instruction to the contrary. 
l6This includes the Petitioner's obligation to file releases of any and all lis pendens he's 
placed on Respondent's properties upon entry of an appropriate Order following formalization of 
the parties' agreement. 
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parties. That goal would be rendered a nullity if Petitioner could simply re-file his claims after 
dismissing them.17 As noted previously, the Court finds, by a preponderance of the evidence, 
that the parties agreed that all claims arising before November 10th would be dismissed, 
including claims made by either party against relatives of the other, and the dismissal of all such 
claims and causes of action would be with prejudice All claims not related to the children and 
arising after November 10th would be referred to binding arbitration. In sum, other than to 
enforce an arbitration award, any claims arising after the November 10th date will not be brought 
for action in any court. 
1f26 The Court finds that a few provisions in Respondent's version of the agreement, and 
challenged by Petitioner as not having been expressly negotiated, were included by necessary 
implication, and/or as a logical extension of the agreed-upon terms. See, e.g., fflfl 1, 22 of 
Respondent's Ex. A, Final Stipulation and Settlement Agreement. 
f 27 In summary, after receiving and considering all the testimony at the February 28th hearing, 
the Court found, and informed the parties, that an enforceable agreement (negotiated on 
November 10th and further refined on December 8th) had been reached between the parties. The 
Court also found that as between the competing versions of the settlement agreement offered by 
the parties, the Respondent's version-although not perfect-more accurately depicted the 
agreement between the parties. The Court hereby re-affirms those initial findings. 
1f28 After making its initial findings on February 28th, the Court reviewed-paragraph by 
paragraph- Respondent's Ex. A with the goal of resolving any remaining differences between the 
parties. The parties agreed on the record as to the following remaining issues: 
A. Waiver of Claims and Causes of Action: With respect to ^|16, the parties agreed 
to retain the first sentence of that paragraph and delete the remainder. 
B. Arbitration costs: The parties had previously agreed on November 10th that on 
any issue that went to arbitration, the losing party would pay the other's total fees 
and costs. At the February 28th hearing the parties further agreed that each would 
pay his/her own costs if arbitration did not result in a clear winner. 
C. Tuition cost reimbursement: Within 40 days of a final settlement agreement 
being signed, Petitioner would reimburse Respondent the $3,500.00 for tuition 
costs already incurred by her on behalf of the children. 
17This is not a far-fetched fear; that is precisely what Petitioner did in connection with the 
allegations he made on February 27, 2006 in order to secure an ex parte civil stalking injunction 
order. Those allegations had been previously raised in an earlier civil stalking injunction case 
which Petitioner had filed against Respondent, and then dismissed without prejudice in January 
2006. There is no basis for believing that the judge who issued the ex parte Order was aware of 
this fact, nor that Petitioner brought it to the judge's attention. 
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Tf29 hi addition to the above-stated Findings concerning the substance of the parties' 
agreement, the Court believes it important to enter additional Findings concerning how the 
parties have conducted themselves in this process, as those issues directly impact the decision 
whether enforcing the settlement agreement reached by the parties is in the children's best 
interest. 
[^30 First, with respect to Petitioner, the Court finds that Petitioner's deliberate failure to 
inform the Court on February 28th that the day before he had secured an ex parte civil stalking 
injunction to be strong evidence of his lack of good faith in this case. This is especially true 
given the extended discussion at the February 28th hearing concerning how the parties would deal 
with past, current and future litigation. Further evidence of Petitioner's lack of commitment to 
resolving differences between the parties in a constructive manner is found in his version of the 
parties' agreement, hi it, Petitioner deletes two provisions which require the parties to cooperate. 
See, e.g., Ex. 1 to Petitioner's Response and Agreement with Motion to Enforce Settlement 
Agreement, f 11 (crossing-out provision requiring "each party . . . to do those things necessary to 
facilitate the international travel of the other, including but perhaps not limited to signing any 
necessary documents"); see also ^22 (crossing-out provision specifically requiring the parties "to 
cooperate with the other through counsel or otherwise to reduce this stipulation to a final Order 
and to cooperate in each and every other way necessary and proper to make sure that this 
Stipulation and the Order are carried out in every detail.") Finally, as referenced at note 10 supra, 
this Court is very concerned that the scenario raised by Petitioner during the discussion of the 
children's passports and international travel is indicative of his inclination to exploit to its fullest 
potential every possible opportunity to frustrate Respondent. 
|^31 As to the Respondent, the Court hastens to add that she, too, is not blameless on this 
issue. As became evident in the course of the April 11th hearing on the civil stalking injunction, 
Respondent deliberately published an objectionable picture of Petitioner with the clear intent to 
embarrass him. See April 20th Order. It may be that because Respondent is represented by 
counsel, her actions have been more closely monitored and circumscribed. Nevertheless, 
Respondent has similarly demonstrated that she is not above taking action designed to annoy 
Petitioner. 
^32 In further support of its concerns about these parties' ability to successfully co-parent the 
children, the Court hereby incorporates by reference its April 20th Order detailing the ways in 
which the parties choose to continue harassing the other. To be sure, in some limited areas 
Petitioner and Respondent have managed to show some ability to work cooperatively, as in the 
case of the "week-on, week-off' parenting schedule. Even then, however, the parties appear 
incapable of resisting the impulse to place stumbling blocks in the path of cooperation. 
Tf33 As noted previously, see supra [^3 and accompanying note 4, the parties presented no 
evidence during the Febmary 28th hearing on the question whether the custody sharing provisions 
of the settlement agreement are in the best interests of the children. The Guardian ad Litem 
briefly referenced her "concern[] about proceeding without the input of the custody evaluators," 
43-
but the issue was not discussed further. The Guardian specifically expressed concern with the 
"week-on, week-off" schedule for children (who are presently ages 6 and 8). The Court has been 
provided with no evidence from which it can draw reasonable conclusions as to the advisability 
and sustainabiUty of such a shared-parenting schedule. Although among Petitioner's voluminous 
filings in this case he has included selected portions of what appear to be a draft custody 
evaluator's report. However, given that this case has not, to this point, been certified for trial, the 
Court has not had the opportunity to review final copies of those reports nor to receive testimony 
from the custody evaluators. 
^|34 Prior to making a final determination on the advisability of enforcing the child custody 
provisions of this agreement, the Court needs to receive additional evidence. Specifically, the 
Court believes it necessary to take testimony from the custody evaluators and to review their 
reports in full. To the extent that the information in those reports (or conclusions and 
recommendations based on that information) may be outdated the custody evaluators will be 
required to update them. Furthermore, after receiving all relevant and updated evidence the 
Court finds it necessary to receive additional input, the Court reserves the right to appoint a third 
evaluator to review the extant reports, to interview the parties and children, and to provide an 
independent assessment to the Court regarding the proposed child-custody arrangements. If a 
third evaluator is appointed by the Court, Petitioner and Respondent will each bear one-half of 
the associated costs. 
f 35 For the sake of providing the children with some stability, pending a final determination 
of custody issues, it is fair and appropriate that the parties continue their present custody-sharing 
arrangement. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
T|36 As part of their settlement negotiations during November 10lh and December 8th, the 
parties reached an enforceable agreement as detailed herein. Except as noted below with respect 
to legal and physical custody and parent-time schedules, the agreement-as construed by the 
Court-resolves all remaining issues between the parties. 
[^37 This Court is not bound to accept the agreement of the parties on an "all or nothing" 
basis. The Court has the authority, and duty, to evaluate each of the terms of the parties' 
agreement and determine whether those terms are consistent with the best interests of the 
children. 
J^38 It is against the public policy of this State for the Court to surrender its responsibility for 
determining the children's best interest to a non-judicial officer, even if that individual is 
mutually agreed upon by the parties. While the Court can agree and support the parties' efforts 
to resolve minor parenting disputes with the assistance of a Special Master, final determination 
of custody/parenting issues that cannot be resolved by a Special Master must lie with the Court. 
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[^39 Notwithstanding the parties' agreement, the Court is unable to conclude that the custody 
and parenting provisions of that agreement are in the children's best interest. 
f 40 Other than the provisions related to custody, the terms of the agreement reached by the 
parties are fair, appropriate, and enforceable under the law. 
1J41 The agreement to arbitrate all issues ansing after November 10, 2005 that do not involve 
the children is legally enforceable. Other than to enforce an arbitration award, issues satisfying 
these criteria shall not be brought in any court. 
f42 The Commissioner will need to certify for trial the issue of the legal and physical custody 
of the children. 
JUDGMENT 
[^43 The parties have entered into an enforceable agreement as specified herein. Other than 
the issue of the legal and physical custody of the minor children, which will be reserved for trial, 
the parties have reached agreement on all remaining issues between them. Pending trial, the 
parties' parent-time sharing agreement will remain m place. The custody evaluators are 
requested to update and finalize their reports and provide them to the Court within forty-five (45) 
days from the entry of this decision. So that these custody evaluation reports can be completed 
on a timely basis, the parties to split evenly the associated cost; the Court reserves for trial the 
ultimate determination of how those costs are to be allocated between the parties. The matter is 
referred back to the Commissioner to complete all necessary steps to certify this matter for trial. 
[^44 The Court requests that the Guardian ad Litem prepare and submit an Order consistent 
with the views expressed in this opinion. 
So Ordered by the Court this 8th day of May, 2006. 
Denise Posse Lmd 
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